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ABSTRACT

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are networked
control systems used in many critical infrastructure areas such as power water
and transportation. Many of these systems continue to use legacy field devices
that lack cyber security features. The field device security preprocessor is a
bump-in-the-wire security solution of legacy field devices. This thesis describes
the design and analysis of a dual Bloom filter structure for use in a field device
security preprocessor. A dual Bloom filter is a variant of the traditional Bloom
filter, that performs role based access checks in O(1) time. It is shown this
structure, which can produce false authentications is shown to be acceptable for
this security use thought analysis and penetration testing. Analysis and testing
shows that in spite of false positives this structure can provide the required level
of security, while maintaining the required level of performance on low cost
hardware.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis describes the design, development and testing of a field device
security preprocessor for role based access control and challenge response using
dual Bloom filters. The development of this device comes out of a need
previously found and described by Hieb and Graham [1] in their research at the
University of Louisville in the intelligent systems research lab (ISRL).
1.1. Background and Motivation

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are at the heart of
the critical infrastructure that includes the power grid and water treatment
facilities. For a variety of reasons industrial control systems (ICS) have depended
on “security by obscurity,” however, in recent years these systems have become
increasingly vulnerable to cyber security attacks. The Stuxnet virus discovered in
June 2010 [2] is an excellent recent example of the thread to ICS. Vendors,
operators, and the government are now aware of the need to protect ICS from
cyber based attacks [3]. It has become obvious that this method of security is no
longer enough. Protecting these systems has fallen to traditional network
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security techniques such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS),
however, ICS have differences from traditional networks that require uniquely
tailored solutions, protecting field devices is an example of this.
Protection at the field device level is necessary to ensure that these systems
are not compromised or damaged, while operability and performance is
maintained. Upgrading these systems directly to include the necessary security
features such as access control, authentication, and integrity is not an option for
most of the devices. SCADA field devices have long lifetimes typically measured
in decades, these older devices do not have the processing power or memory to
efficiently implement these security enhancements. Also due to the large number
of different field devices, implementation of such security onto all of these legacy
devices would be an unfeasible task.
1.2. Designing For Security, Designing for Feasibility

When thinking about a solution for security of these legacy SCADA field
devices it is important to consider the feasibility in terms of cost and
performance design requirements. Designing a system that has low cost typically
means the hardware will be low performance as well; this means it is important
to implement software that is efficient, minimal and secure. A solution that
creates a large amount of overhead and time delay may cause performance
issues in these critical systems, and any practical security solution must provide
security enhancements within the time constraints of these systems.
2

Hieb and Graham[1] have recently proposed a field device security preprocessor (FD-SPP) using a microkernel based security architecture [4] and built
on low cost commercially available hardware running. The effectiveness of the
FD-SPP will eventually be measured using verification test, but current work is
focused on a functional prototype implemented on low cost hardware. Selection
of an operating system will play role in verification, without a verified operating
system software running on the FD-SPP cannot be verified.
It is obvious that typical operating systems such as Linux or Windows,
which contains several million lines of code are too large to be completely
verified. Exploits in these operating systems are often found by attackers and
require updates to patch these exploits. It is important to select an operating
system that does require this frequent updating and has a kernel that can be
trusted as bug free. For this reason, further discussed in Chapter 4, a microkernel based operating system called OKL4 was selected to serve as the
operating system for this project.
Another important consideration in the design of the FD-SPP is a low footprint in terms of overhead and performance impact on the ICS. Role based
access control and authentication have been indicated by prior research as
necessary security enhancements to SCADA devices[5]. The implementation of
these is often costly in terms of computation time. Using a low foot print microkernel will help keep computation costs down, but it is important to implement
these security features as efficiently as possible. Previous work at the University
3

of Louisville by Brad Luyster worked to implement role based access control on a
low footprint microkernel[6], this work aims to create an alternative method of
role based access control with a low enough foot print to be implemented in
SCADA systems. In order to achieve this, this thesis explores a variation on
Bloom Filters (discussed in Chapter 2) to efficiently implement role based access
control (RBAC) and make decisions on when to challenge ICS messages. This
data structure also reduces the amount of space required by the RBAC lookup
table. This data structure performs lookups in a time independent of the number
of entries of the table allowing quick lookups for any number of entries. The low
foot print created by this data structure in terms of storage allows it to be easily
implemented on low cost hardware.
1.3. Organization

The second chapter of this Thesis provides a literature review and
description of the data structure that is at the heart of the security feature
implementation of this project, the Bloom filter. Chapter three describes the
design of the security features for the FD-SPP using a Bloom filter as well as the
required modifications needed to a SCADA communication protocol for these
features to be utilized. The fourth chapter describes the implementation of a
prototype field device security preprocessor (FD-SPP) for the purposes of initial
evaluation of the dual Bloom filter structure. The fifth chapter describes the
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testing of the FD-SPP in a simple SCADA network. Conclusions and directions for
future work are presented in the sixth and final chapter.

5

2.

INTRODUCTION TO BLOOM FILTERS

A Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure proposed by Burton
H. Bloom in 1970. In the original paper[7], he proposed an alternative hashcoding technique which traded of a small amount of allowable error for a
performance increase in both time and space. This hash-coding technique is now
known as a Bloom Filter and is commonly used in a wide variety of applications.
A Bloom filter is used to determine whether or not a particular item is a
member of a given set. When the Bloom filter is queried with respect to a given
member, the Bloom filter always returns true if the member of the set, however
if the queried value is not a member of the set, the Bloom filter will not always
return false. The rate at which the Bloom filter returns true for elements not in
the set is known as the false positive rate of the structure. A theoretical Bloom
Filter does not have any false negatives.

6

2.1. Properties of Bloom Filters

The basic structure of a Bloom filter consists of a bit array of length m. All of
the bits of this array are initially set to 0, which represents an empty Bloom filter.
In order to add an item to the Bloom filter, the item is passed through k hash
functions, each producing a different value, ak (

), which

represents one of the 1-m bits of the Bloom filter such that a1 ≠ a2 ≠ … ≠ ak-1 ≠
ak. The bit corresponding to each of these values is then set to 1. To check an
entry, the entry is passed through the same k hash functions to produce a list of
bit addresses. Each of the bit addresses are then checked in the filter’s bit array;
if all addresses have a 1, then the entry is said to be a member of the set
represented by the Bloom filter [7]. Because different items may have bit
address collisions false positives are possible, but unlikely, when an item not in
the set has a hash address that has been set to 1 by adding multiple members to
the filter. Because given entries are selected based on whether the addresses
deemed by each of the hash functions given the particular entry are set to 1.
The time of the insertion is depends only on the k hash functions and is
independent of both the size in bits of the filter, m, and the number of elements
inserted, n. The insertion takes

time for each item [7].

Shown in Figure 2.1.1 are two elements A and B being added to the Bloom
filter.

7

FIGURE 2.1.1 - Adding elements A and B to a Bloom Filter
To be added to the Bloom filter, the elements A and B are each passed
through five hash functions (k=5) to produce five bit address in the Bloom filter.
These bit values are then all set to 1. Additional items are inserted into the
Bloom filter in the same way. Given a filter, checking if A and B are member is
done similar to insertion; the values are passed once again through the hash
functions to produce five bit address which are each checked in the filter; if
every bit address is equal to 1, then the item is said to be in the set represented
by the Bloom filter. The time of a membership check is also only dependent on
the k hash functions and is independent of both the size in bits of the filter, m,
and the number of elements stored in the filter, n. The membership check also
takes

time [7]. Figure 2.1.2 shows the checking of two new elements, C

and D are in the filter. Neither C nor D is a member of the set that is represented
by the filter BF. D is determined not to be in the set, but C is a false positive.

8

FIGURE 2.1.2 - Determining if C and D are in the set

In order to check if each of these values are in the filter, they are each
passed through the five hash functions to generate corresponding bit addresses
for C and D. When checking D, it is apparent that D is not a member of the set
because not all the bit addresses contain 1’s. According ti the filter, C is a
member of the set because all the values from its hash functions are 1. Since C
was not added to the set and it is not a true member of the set, this is a false
positive. That Bloom filters have false positive rates is one of their limitations.
Since each of the hash functions should produce the address bits
uniformly, the odds of any particular entry being a false positive is a function of
the number of bits that are set to 1 and the size of the Bloom filter. After a given
number of entries “n” have been added to the Bloom filter, the probability that a
particular bit address is still 0 is give in equation 2.1.1.

(

)
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(2.1.1)

Using the probability of each bit being set to 1, the false positive rate of
the Bloom filter can be calculated. Using this probability, an estimate of the
number of entries that are set to 1 can be calculated using equation 2.1.2.

(2.1.2)

This is important because it shows that the probability of an entry being falsely
accepted is exponentially related to the number of bits set to 1’s over the total
number of bits, m. Since each bit is distinct, the probability of the bit at the
second bit address being a 1 is slightly less than the probability the bit at the first
bit address was since there is one less 1 and one less bit to select. The
probability the bit at the first address is a 1 can be calculated using equation
2.1.3.
(2.1.3)

The probability the bit at the second address is a 1 assuming the first address
contains a 1 is calculated using equation 2.1.4.
(2.1.4)
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This trend continues for additional bit addresses for all of the k hash functions
and the probability of the ith address containing a 1 assuming all the addresses 1
through i-1 contain a 1 can be calculated using equation 2.1.5.

(2.1.5)

For a given filter the false positive rate of the filter can be calculated as simply
the product of all the probabilities of each of the bit addresses defined by the k
hash functions. The formula to calculate the false positive rate (pb) for any given
Bloom filter is shown in equation 2.1.6.
(2.1.6)

∏

((

(

) )

)

∏

For very large values of m such that m >> k, which is the case for Bloom filters
which desire a low false positive rate, this equation can be shown to have a
much simpler form as shown in equation 2.1.7.
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∏

((

(

) )

)

(2.1.7)
(

(

) )

[6]

2.2. The Random Filter

Implementing a Bloom filter presents some specific challenges.
Theoretically, a Bloom filter creates a data structure which will encodes a data
set into a small data structure, set membership can be checked very quickly, but
requires sacrificing a small amount of allowable error but when it comes to
implementation. The properties of the Bloom filter discussed in section 2.1 are
theoretical. The problem with implementation is with the hash functions;
specifically identifying hash functions that produce k uniformly distributed distinct
values from k hash functions [8]. In fact, most implementations of Bloom filters
are not true Bloom filters, but a very similar data structure called a Random Filter
[8].
A random filter is an adaption of the original Bloom filter proposed in 1998
by Wang, Yang and Tseug [8]. Unlike the Bloom filter, the random filter has hash
functions that are completely independent of each other and are a permitted to
produce the same output with any given key. Thus, in order to add an item to a
random filter, the item will be passed through k hash functions, each producing a
value ak such that

[8]. This produces a different false positive rate

than the original Bloom filter, but is much easier to implement. All the other
12

properties of the random filter are the same as the Bloom filter. Like the Bloom
filter, the false positive rate of the random filter is related to the number of bits
set to 1 in the random filter. After n entries into the random filter, the probability
that a particular bit is still sit to 0 is given in equation 2.2.1.

(

(2.2.1)

)

Since each of the hash functions produces a value that is independent and also
uniformly distributed from 0 to m-1, the false positive rate of a random filter can
be calculated using equation 2.2.2.

(

(

(2.2.2)

) ) [8]

Besides being easier to implement, the random filter has another advantage over
the Bloom filter: its false positive rate is less than that of the Bloom filter.
Assuming

:

(

(

) )

(

(

) )

Proof, derived by [8] is given in Appendix A
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(2.2.3)

This being shown, it is obvious that the random Filter is the better choice
for implementation. Numerical implementations of these two filters also show
that the random filter offers a slightly lower false positive rate than the Bloom
filter [8]. More important than having a lower false positive rate is the ability to
build it using independent hash functions. In computing literature, the random
filter is often referred to as a Bloom filter and the false positive rates shown for
Bloom filters are often those of the random filter. In order to adhere to common
practice, the random filter will be referred to a Bloom filter for the remainder of
this document, and all references to a Bloom filter unless specified can be
assumed to be implemented as a random filter and not as originally proposed by
Bloom in 1970.
2.3. Parameter Selection for building a Bloom Filter

The Bloom filter sacrifices a small false positive rate in exchange for both
a small time and space constraint. For example, no matter how many elements
are added to a Bloom filter it always stays the same size, and no matter how
many elements are added to the filter both insertions and membership checks
will always take the same amount of time. However, if too many items are added
to the Bloom filter, its false positive rate will increase and eventually become
100%. So even though the space required for a Bloom filter is usually small
relative to the actual data stored in it, it is important to make the Bloom filter
large enough so that once all the elements are added the false positive rate is
14

sufficiently low. In order to achieve this, the optimal values for m and k can be
found given a desired false positive rate and the number of elements n that will
be inserted into the set. As with most optimization problems, the location of the
optimal values are found using a first derivative; however, the derivative of the
false positive formula for the Bloom filter is one that is not particularly easy to
solve. For this reason, an approximation of the false positive rate formula can be
used.

(

(

) )

(

)

[9]

(2.3.1)

The properties of Bloom filters are well known and taking the derivative with
respect to k and solving for k gives the well-known relationship between the
optimal k and m and n.
[9]

(2.3.2)

This equation can be plugged into the approximated false positive rate and
solved for m, which allows for the size of the Bloom filter to be determined given
a particular number of entries and false positive rate. However, this value like
the value for k cannot be used exactly because they most both be natural
numbers.
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(2.3.3)

This value in turn can be plugged back in to the optimal k equation so that the
optimal number of hash functions can be found. This value as well must be
turned into an natural number since it is not possible to have a non-natural
number of hash functions. These formulas can still give a good estimate around
the values for m and k, and then natural values can be checked into the false
positive rate formula to find the one that produces the lowest rate. It is also
important to note that the false positive rate returned by this function as well is
merely an approximation. The actual false positive rate of the Bloom Filter
requires the knowing the exact percentage of bits that are set to 1 to the size of
the filter, which can only be found by building the Bloom filter. Different data
sets will produce different number of 1’s due to different collisions among the
hash functions even for the same number of entries [10], but all of these rates
will be fairly close (at least same order of magnitude) to the approximated false
positive rate. Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 show a comparison of false positive rates
and percent difference from the theoretical false positive rate for two different
data sets of size n=100, to several different Bloom filters. All Bloom filters use
the same number of hash functions k=4. These two figures show that adding
different values or using different hash functions each produce different false
positive rates. More discussion on these differing false positive rates can be
found in section 4.7.
16
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2.4. Applications of Bloom Filters

Bloom filters are used in a large variety of applications, from networking
applications like packet routing, to spell checkers, to helping with safe browsing.
Spell checking is one of the most classic and historic use of a Bloom filter and
were even used in early UNIX systems [11]. In these early computing systems,
space was a scarce resource and using a Bloom filter allowed for a very compact
data structure. Unlike most data structures, Bloom filters often can be stored in
smaller spaces than the list could be. For example, a Bloom filter-based spell
checker can store its dictionary in a much smaller space than the dictionary itself.
An example Bloom filter was created for over 80,000 words, which took up over
680kb of disk space. Creating a bloom filter with a false positive rate of
% only takes around 520kb of space [12]. Similar to the spell checkers,
Bloom filters have been proposed to store unsuitable passwords in security
systems [11]. Basically the same concept that was used for spell checkers could
be used to reject weak passwords [13]; add all the weak passwords to a Bloom
filter, then when the user selects a password, it can be quickly rejected if it is in
the weak password filter. Additionally, a false positive here and there really does
not matter in this application since it will merely require the user to select a
different password. This means a large dataset can be highly compressed using a
Bloom Filter-based approach for this application. Also, the speed of a Bloom filter
for any large dataset will mostly likely be faster than any look up for these large
dictionaries.
18

More recently, networking applications have begun to use Bloom filters for
a wide variety of topics. These applications include collaborating in overlay and
peer-to-peer networks, resource routing, packet routing, measurement, and
more [11]. Many network uses of Bloom filters involve the reduction of network
traffic. For example, assume User A wants to send a large number of files to
User B, but User B already has some of these files. Since sending all the files
would waste network traffic, Bloom filters can be used to determine which files
to send. Both user A and user B create Bloom filters for their file list, and user B
sends their Bloom filter to user A. user A can then easily find the intersection of
the two Bloom filters by performing a bitwise AND. Entries that are not in this
new intersection filter are the files that need to be sent to User B. Because the
Bloom filter may have false positives, not all the files in the original list may be
sent. However, if this setting is used a distributed peer to peer system where the
user is getting files from multiple agents to increase download time, the
redundancy of the multiple users should allow for all the files to be transferred in
most cases [11].
Google Chrome also uses Bloom filters in its safe surf features. According
to Google®, Chrome downloads a list of sites that have been known to contain
malware or are known to engage in phishing.
“To save space and to avoid giving out URLs to malware and phishing
websites, the lists contain enough information in most cases to verify that if
a site is phishing or malware, but does not contain enough information to
19

definitively say if the site phishing or malware. If the URL of the site you're
on matches anything in the list, your browser will contact Google’s servers
for more information to make a decision. Your browser sends information
that does not let Google uniquely determine what site you are visiting (for
the technically savvy, the first 32 bits of a SHA-256 hash of the URL is sent).
If your computer then decides that you’re visiting a risky site, it can warn
you about it.” – Google Chrome Help [14]

Looking into the source of the chromium.org project [15], which is used
for both the Google Chrome web browser and the Chromium OS, reveals the use
of Bloom filters for the client side safe search check. In order to perform a site
check, the requested URL is stripped down to its base and checked into a Bloom
filter which contains a list of all the known URL’s which are associated with
malware and phishing sites. If the checked site is in the Bloom filter, then a hash
is sent to Google’s safe browsing service to verify that the site is indeed a known
malicious site and not a false positive [14], [15]. The use of a Bloom filter
serves multiple purposes for the Google Chrome safe search. For one, it is much
smaller and faster than any type of lookup table that Google could provide with
Chrome. Secondly, it allows checks to be performed client side, without
distributing Google’s list of malicious URLs since there is no way to get the
elements of the set back out of a Bloom filter. The speed at which the Bloom
filter can make checks also makes these checks unnoticed to the user since
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network queries are only needed when a malicious site is visited or the
occasional false positive. Avoiding these network queries improves the speed for
the general user as well as reducing the load on Google’s servers. This novel
application of Bloom filter’s shows how useful these data structures can be in
situations where a small false positive rate can be traded-off for space and time.
2.5. A Bloom Filter for Role Based Access Control

Role based access control (RBAC) makes extensive use of sets, and set
membership checks. Bloom filters can be used to implement a role based access
control efficiently. An implementation of role based access was previously
created by Tripuitara and Carbunar that used a modified Bloom filter known as a
cascading Bloom filter as the primary role based access control mechanism [16].
To use a Bloom filter for RBAC, a list of the entire set of <role, operation>
pairs must first be added to the Bloom filter. Adding a <role, operation> pair to
a Bloom filter is the same as adding any other data object to the Bloom filter.
The role and operation are combined into a single byte array, which is then
passed through the ‘k’-hash functions. The bits in the Bloom filter indicated by
the hashes are set to “1” and the <role, operation> pair is inserted in the Bloom
filter. Checks are done in the same way as a traditional Bloom filter check, using
the same hash functions to identify bit locations check the bits for 1s in the filter.
Using a Bloom Filter for access control has its draw backs due to the false
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positive rate property of the Bloom filter however it will be argued in this paper
that the tradeoff for their speed can be worth the cost.
2.6. Variations and Extensions of Bloom Filters

The structure of the Bloom filter allows new data to be added but
disallows the removal of any items because removal could create false negatives.
If all of the 1’s associated with any of the entries into the Bloom filter were
removed, collisions that it shared with other entries could be removed as well,
which creates false negatives for those entries. One of the simplest extensions of
the Bloom filter, known as the counting Bloom filter[9], allows for data to be
removed from the filter. The difference between a Bloom filter and a counting
Bloom filter is when an entry is added, each hash function output corresponds to
a counter instead of a single bit. Each of the counters at the positions selected
by the hash functions is incremented during an insert, and decremented during a
removal [9]. Also, though this certainly helps the false negative problem, it does
not completely eliminate it, since these counters must have a finite maximum
and will eventually become full. For example, if a counting Bloom filter has
counters that go from 0-3, once a counter has four entries, the value of the
counter will be 3. When three of the values are removed, the fourth will become
a false negative. However, if the counter is large enough, it is unlikely that this
will occur, and for some applications this low false negative rate may be
acceptable.
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Several expansions on the counting Bloom filter have been made to use
Bloom filters with streaming data. Generally these streaming data counting
Bloom filters decrement the counters periodically or based special functions to
prevent the counting Bloom filter from filling and only show recent or specific
trends in the data. One such expansion called the time-decaying Bloom filter
uses counters that delay exponentially, which can be used to detect items that
occur frequently in the data stream [17].

23

3.

A DUAL BLOOM FILTER STRUCTURE FOR EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION OF
ROLE BASED ACCESS CONTROL AND CHALLENGE RESPONSE FOR A FIELD
DEVICE SECURITY PRE-PROCESSOR

3.1. The Need for a SCADA Field Device Security Pre-Processor

Industrial control systems have a number of known security vulnerabilities,
and a large number of legacy control systems may no security in some places at
the control system level. Some recent incidents such as the 2006 hacker attack
on a water treatment plant Harrisburg, PA [4] has highlighted the significance of
the cyber threat created by the lack of security in some of the most critical
systems to the nation [4]. Legacy devices are one of the most significant of
these vulnerabilities. Due to the long life times and high replacement cost of
these legacy devices it is desirable to create a bolt-on appliance that can add
security to these legacy devices with minimal cost and performance impact.
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3.2. Access Control and Challenge Response in SCADA networks

The Implementation of a Security Pre-processer for SCADA security
requires a protocol that allows for the implementation of such security. Modbus
is an open and simple protocol commonly used in SCADA networks and
commonly found being used by legacy field devices [18]. Modbus, by default
does not offer any type of mechanisms for role based access control or for
challenge response.
The basic structure of a Modbus message includes the address of the
device the packet is intended for, a function code to tell the device what to do, a
series of data bytes, and error detection bytes which are determined used cyclic
redundancy check (CRC) algorithms [19].
ADDRESS FUNCTION CODE

DATA

CRC

FIGURE 3.2.1 - Typical elements of a Modbus message

Function codes are predefined and specified in the Modbus protocol [19].
Typical function codes include read and write coils and read and write registers.
A sample Modbus exchange is shown in FIGURE 3.2.2.
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MTU

RTU

Modbus Command
Modbus Response

FIGURE 3.2.2 - Standard Modbus exchange

In order to allow for Modbus to support role based access control and
challenge response a couple of small additions have to be made to the Modbus
Protocol[4], [5]. The modified Modbus protocol will be referred to ExtendedModbus when differentiation between it and the original protocol is necessary.
The first required extension to Modbus is to add the concept of a user, and a
user’s secret. This user needs to authenticate (initially and periodically) when
communicating with the Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) or legacy field device. In
order to support users the extended Modbus protocol includes a new function
code, Request Connection, which includes a user ID in the data field to establish
a connection, and allows the access control system to know which user is logging
in. To verify that the user is the user specified in the login request an additional
packet must be added. Extended-Modbus has a second new function code,

Challenge. The HMI side of the system replies to this Extended-Modbus packet
with a third new packet type with a new function code, Response. Keeping in
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tradition with typical Modbus protocol standards the request connection packet
will be returned to the MTU upon a successful connection.

MTU

RTU

Request Connection
Challenge
Response
Request Connection

FIGURE 3.2.3 - Extended Modbus Connection Request

3.2.1. Details of the Extended Modbus Function Codes

Modbus has a large number of unused function codes which allowed the
protocol to be expanded very simply. Shown in Table TABLE 3.2.1 are the
function codes for the new commands that were added to the protocol.
TABLE 3.2.1 Extended Modbus Function Codes
Function Code

Description

40

Connection Request

41

Challenge

42

Challenge Response
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The connection request packet was added as function code 40. This
packet is responsible for sending the user id to the field device. Each user will
have a unique user id which is used by the field device to identify them and look
up their role and their secret. A connection request packet is always challenged
by the field device. The successful completion of this challenge means that the
user has successfully logged in and all packets that are challenged will be
checked with that user’s secret for the duration of the users session. The issue of
a new login request automatically ends the previous user’s session. Multiple
users accessing the device at the same time is not supported at this time.

Byte

1

2

3

4-5

Data

ADDRESS

40

USER ID

CRC

FIGURE 3.2.4 - Packet Structure for Connection Request

The challenge packet is sent from the field device when a packet needs to
be challenged or a user is logging in. This packet contains four 4 bytes of
cryptographic nonce to be used as part of the hash for the response packet.
Byte

1

2

3-6

7-8

Data

ADDRESS

41

NONCE

CRC
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FIGURE 3.2.5 - Packet Structure for Challenge Packet

The challenge response packet is sent from the MTU/HMI as a response
to receiving a challenge from the field device. This packet contains a hash of the
original packet, the cryptographic nonce from the challenge, and the user’s
secret. Construction of this packet is explained more later in Chapter IV.
3.3. Dual Bloom Filters for Modbus Role Based Access Control (RBAC)

The role based access control in this project is similar to the one
mentioned previously in Section 2.5 in the fact that it uses a Bloom filter for
access control by hashing <role, operation> pairs but the Bloom filter
implementation and use is quite different. The RBAC for this project not only
determines whether the packet is allowed, i.e. a user performing an allowed
operation, but also determines whether that packet is critical and therefore
requires a challenge to support integrity and authenticity. In order to achieve this
extra feature the RBAC system uses dual Bloom filters. The Bloom filters have
the exact same number of bits and use the exact same hash functions. When an
entry is to be checked in the RBAC it only has to be passed through the k hash
functions and then it can be checked in both the Bloom filters. The cost of using
two Bloom filters instead of one in terms of computation time is nominal and
results in an access check in O(k). The cost of using the two Bloom filters in
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space is double the cost of use a single Bloom filter since the Bloom filters will
each take up m bits.
Both of the Bloom filters contain <role, operation> pairs, where each
operation is a Modbus packet. The first Bloom filter contains all the allowable
<role, operation> pairs and is responsible for determining if the packet should
be allowed or rejected. The second Bloom filter determines whether the packet
should be challenged. This second filter could contain either all the packets that
need to be challenged or all the packets that do not, a comparison of these
techniques can be found in section 3.5. For now assume the challenge Bloom
filter contains all the entries that are challenged. In this case the following table
illustrates, whether to allow the packet, challenge the packet, or reject the
packet.
TABLE 3.3.1 – Dual Bloom Filter RBAC
Access Bloom Filter

Challenge Bloom Filter

Yes

Yes

Challenge

Yes

No

Allow

No

Yes

Reject

No

No

Reject

Operations that are allowed are performed immediately after the packet is
received; challenged operations are performed only after a successful challenge
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response is received. Operations that are rejected are ignored without are type
of response. Since the access Bloom filter contains all the packets that can be
accepted (Set A), and the challenge Bloom filter contains all the packets that can
be accepted and must be challenged (Set C) if the packet is not in the access
Bloom filter it will not be in the challenge Bloom filter.
(3.3.1)

Figure 3.3.1 shows how the dual Bloom filter RBAC is used to process
Modbus messages, and determine whether to challenge, allow, or reject each
packet.
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Set ret to Challenge Required

Bloom Filter Check Loop

Return ret

[index less than K]

Hash <Role, Operation> using Hash k

Get Bit Position From Hash

[no]
Check Access Bloom Filter

Return Packet Not Valid

[yes]
[no]
Check Requires Challenge Bloom Filter

set ret to Allow Packet Passthrough

Increment Index

FIGURE 3.3.1 - Dual Bloom Filter RBAC Check

3.4. Creation and Analysis of an Example Dual Bloom Filter

The first step to creating a Bloom filter is determining the number of bits
required m, and the number of hash functions required k. These two numbers
can be based on the estimated number of objects that will be added to the
bloom filter and a desired false positive rate. From the properties of the Bloom
filters these two values can be easily calculated using the well-known formulas
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described in section 2.2 using the estimated number of entries that will be
added, n, and the desired false positive rate, p. For this example, let n = 100,
and p = .01. Using the following formula an optimal value for m can be derived.
(3.4.1)

In order to make the code simpler and more efficient, a integer that is a power
of 2 should be selected. This allows for x bits to be selected for each hash
function where m = 2x, and makes having uniform bit selection from the hash
functions easier to achieve. For this example let m = 1024, this is the power of
two above the m necessary for the false positive rate and will offer a lower false
positive rate then the desired p of .01, while letting m = 512, the next closest
power, would have a false positive rate of greater than .01 when 100 entries
were added. Now that m is selected and optimal k can be selected using m and n
as follows.
(3.4.2)

The optimal value of k is 7.0979, but it is not possible to have only a part of a
hash function or select part of a bit, therefore an integer value must be selected
for k. Since 7.0979 is between 7 or 8, we can test both of these to see which one
is likely to have a lower false positive rate using our value of “m” and “n”.
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(3.4.3)

The value of k should be selected as 7 since this produces a lower false positive
rate, also using less hash functions will improve the speed of both Bloom filter
entry additions, and access checks.
Now that the parameters have been selected entries can be added, to the
dual Bloom filter structure. The following <role, operation> pairs were added to
the dual Bloom filters. The first number is the role id, second is the hex data
that represents the operation to be performed. The last value is a yes or no
representing whether the packet should be challenged and therefore added to
both filters.
TABLE 3.4.1 Example <Role, Modbus Packet> Entries
Role

Operation

Needs Challenge

1

01020000000C780F

No

2

01020000000C780F

No
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1

010F0000000401003E96

Yes

1

010F000000040101FF56

Yes

1

010F000000040102BF57

Yes

1

010F0000000401037E97

Yes

1

010F0000000401043F55

Yes

1

010F000000040105FE95

Yes

1

010F000000040106BE94

Yes

1

010F0000000401077F54

Yes

1

010F0000000401083F50

Yes

1

010F000000040109FE90

Yes

1

010F00000004010ABE91

Yes

1

010F00000004010B7F51

Yes

1

010F00000004010C3E93

Yes

1

010F00000004010DFF53

Yes

1

010F00000004010EBF52

Yes

1

010F00000004010F7E92

Yes

After creating a Bloom filter is it’s possible to more accurately determine its false
positive rate. We have added 18 entries therefore n = 18. Using the previously
derived equations for p given m, n, and k, the false positive rate of the Bloom
filter can be shown as:
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(

(

)

)

(3.4.4)

However this is merely the theoretical false positive rate of the approximation of
the Bloom filter after 18 entries. Once we have actually created the Bloom filter
the number of ones in the Bloom filter can be used to calculate the actual false
positive rate of this specific Bloom filter. This is done by counting the number of
bits in this Bloom filter that have been set to 1. This Bloom Filter is shown in the
following byte array of hex values:
{ 0xc0, 0x41, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, 0x28, 0x28, 0x04, 0x80, 0x14, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x92, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x80, 0x00, 0x20, 0x04, 0x08, 0x02, 0x44, 0x22, 0x08,
0x08, 0x04, 0x00, 0x08, 0x05, 0x04, 0x00, 0x80, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x04, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00,
0x01, 0x81, 0x40, 0x02, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x40, 0x08,
0x12, 0x00, 0x29, 0x18, 0x00, 0x08, 0x0b, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00,
0x11, 0x00, 0x20, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x24, 0x60, 0x08, 0x06, 0x40, 0x00,
0x09, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x20, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, 0x00, 0x08,
0x01, 0x4a, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x08, 0x48, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x42, 0x06,
0x00, 0x04, 0x41, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00 }

This Bloom filter of 1024 bits has 119 bits set to the value of 1. Therefore, the
probability of any single bit being a 1 is simply 119/1024.
(3.4.5)
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since the number of bits in the second Bloom filter is known as well, the nonchallenged false positive rate can be calculated as well. The non-challenged false
positive rate is the odds of an attacker performing an operation that should be
restricted without knowing the authentication secret. In order for a value not to
be challenged it must be in the first Bloom filter but not in the second Bloom
filter. Since all the bits in the second Bloom filter are also one in the first Bloom
filter the only way for the entry not to be challenged is for the entry to require at
least one of the bits that are only in the first Bloom filter. For this example the
second bloom filter has 106 bits set to 1. This means that there are 13 bits not
shared between the Bloom filters. Therefore the non-challenged false positive
rate can be calculated as:

(

)(

)

(3.4.6)

As mentioned previously, the second filter could be designed to store the entries
that do not need to be challenged as opposed to the entries that do need to be
challenged. In this design, in order for an entry not to be challenged it must be
in the second Bloom filter. If a value is in the second Bloom filter then it will also
be in the first Bloom filter since all the ones in the second Bloom filter will be set
in the first Bloom filter. Therefore this value can be calculated in the same way
that the false positive rate for the original Bloom filter was. The theoretical value
can be calculated using the false positive formula, using n=2 since there were
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two entries that were not challenged:

(

(

)

)

(3.4.7)

Also since this Bloom filter was actually created the number of ones can be
counted and the actual false positive rate can be calculated.

(

(3.4.8)

)

For this example the second Bloom filter used for challenge response has a much
lower false positive rate than the first and therefore should be used if this data is
used in an actual system.
3.5. Comparison of the Two Challenge Response Implementations

In the example above there was a difference in the two false positive rates of
several orders of magnitude. This section will discuss and prove whether or not
this is true for all data sets or if there is a cut off where the other implementation
produces a smaller false positive rate. Start by expanding the formula to include
an additional variable c; this will represent the number of entries that need to be
challenged. In the second example above, operations that were in the Access
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Bloom filter but were not in the challenge response Bloom filter were challenged.
In this case, the false positive rate of non-challenged packets is the false positive
rate of the challenge response Bloom Filter. This Bloom filter will have n - c
entries therefore:

(

)

(3.5.1)

For this example the value of k will be assumed to be the optimal value based on
the access Bloom filter therefore:
(3.5.2)

This allows the formula for p to be written as
(3.5.3)
(

)

The second Bloom filter strategy for deciding challenges, the first one
implemented in the prior example, involves both Bloom filters. The first Bloom
filter of containing n entries and the second Bloom filter containing c entries. In
order for a non-challenged false positive to occur at least one bit must be in the
first Bloom filter that is not in the second Bloom filter. In order to calculate this it

39

is necessary to determine the number of bits that are one in the first Bloom filter
that are not in the second Bloom filter.
First assume that c identical entries have been added to both Bloom filters. This
means there are n - c entries to add to the first Bloom filter. The theoretical
number of ones that is added to this filter when c entries already exist will be the
number of ones in one filter but not in the other. The number of ones after n
entries will be equal to:

(

)

(

)

(3.5.4)

And after c entries it will be:
(3.5.5)

Therefore formula 3.5.6 will calculate the number of ones not shared by the
Bloom filters

(

)
(
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(

)
)

(3.5.6)

Using this, the false positive rate of non-challenged entries can be calculated by
using the optimal value of k using the following formula:

(

(

)

( )

(3.5.7)

)

(

)

( )

(

)

This formula uses the theoretical false positive rate for a bloom filter using k-1
hash functions and size m, with n entries, multiplied by the difference in the
number of ones calculated previously over m.
To simplify the comparison of the two formulas the value of m that is based on n
and the desired false positive rate can be used. This leaves the two formulas:
Non-Challenges Stored in Bloom Filter
(3.5.8)
(

)

Challenges Stored in Bloom Filter

(

)
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(3.5.9)

From these two formulas it can be noted that the false positive rate is dependent
on the ratio between c and n, let this ratio be equal to r.
Non-Challenges Stored in Bloom Filter
(3.5.10)

Challenges Stored in Bloom Filter
)

(3.5.11)

These two equations will always intersect minimally at r=0 and r=1, which
produce false positive rates of p and 0 respectively. For a realistic example, p will
be selected to be very small, p << 1, so as p gets smaller and smaller the false
positive rates of the non-challenge method decreases exponentially while the
challenge Bloom filter only decreases linearly. This means that the non-challenge
Bloom filter will have a smaller false positive rate for any small value of p. Figure
3.5.1 is a plot showing that when p = .001, the non-challenge Bloom filter
method produces a lower false positive rate for all r values.
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FIGURE 3.5.1 Comparison of false positive rates of Challenge and Non-Challenge
Implementations with p = .001
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FIGURE 3.5.2 Comparison of false positive rates of Challenge and Non-Challenge
Implementations with r = .75

Shown in figure 3.5.2 is a comparison of the non-challenged false positive
rates for the two implementation methods for a ratio between challenged
operations and total operations of .75. From here it can be seen that as the
false positive rate of the access Bloom filter decreases the filter containing nonchallenged operations decreases very rapidly, while the filter containing
challenged operations only decreases linearly and is much greater than the nonchallenged method.
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Therefore if we select the non-challenge method for the second Bloom
filter the false positive rate, which is the odds of a potential attack packet making
it through the Bloom filter, is equal to
(3.6.10)

where p is the desired false positive rate selected when creating the access
Bloom filter and r is the ratio of challenged entries to all entries entered into the
Bloom filter.
Now that the second filter contains <role, operation> pairs not to
challenge, instead of pairs to challenge, the flow of the method that determines
whether to allow, reject, or challenge an operation must be changed slightly. The
following table, similar to the one shown previously 3.4.1 shows what to do
when a pair is in or is not in each of the Bloom filters. Since the second filter still
determines whether or not to challenge an operation, it is still listed as the
challenge Bloom filter.
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TABLE 3.5.1 Updated RBAC Responses
Access Bloom Filter

Challenge Bloom Filter

Yes

Yes

Allow

Yes

No

Challenge

No

Yes

Reject

No

No

Reject

Once again it is not possible for an operation to be in the Challenge Bloom filter
and not the Access one, since the Challenge Bloom filter contains a set of
elements that is a subset of the ones in the Access filter. This change to the
table forces the implementation to change slightly as well. The flow diagram for
implementation of the updated RBAC policy is shown below.
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Set ret to Allow Packet Passthrough

Bloom Filter Check Loop

Return ret

[index less than K]

Hash <Role, Operation> using Hash k

Get Bit Position From Hash

[no]
Check Access Bloom Filter

Return Packet Not Valid

[yes]
[no]
Check Requires Challenge Bloom Filter

Set ret to Challenge

Increment Index

FIGURE 3.5.3 Updated Flow Diagram for RBAC check
In the next chapter the implementation and testing of this RBAC and challenge
response policy for SCADA security will be discussed.
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4.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIELD DEVICE SECURITY PRE-PROCESSOR FOR
SCADA USING DUAL BLOOM FILTERS FOR ACCESS CONTROL

4.1. The Field Device Security Pre-Processor

The field device security preprocessor is a device being developed at the
University of Louisville for the National Institute for Hometown Security (NIHS).
It expands upon previously developed technologies developed at the University
of Louisville for hardening legacy remote terminal units against cyber-attacks for
HIHS [1], [4], [20]. The device will act as an add-on to existing legacy remote
terminal units and can be added to existing industrial control systems with
minimal hardware and software changes. Adding the field device security
preprocessor (FD-SPP) to an existing unit such as a legacy remote terminal unit
is performed by disconnecting the existing network connection from the remote
terminal unit and connecting it instead to the master side of the field device, and
then creating a connection between the remote terminal unit(RTU) and the slave
side of the field device. This way the all the traffic that normally would be
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received by the RTU is now received instead by the FD-SPP. The FD-SPP adds
support for new security features such as authentication, and role based access
control to the existing terminal units, however the FD-SPP requires the master
side of the system to support this mechanism as well. This can be done via a
software upgrade on the HMI/MTU or with another hardware device similar to
the FD-SPP.

Communication
Network

Legacy
Legacy Field
Field Device
Device

Process
Equipment

FD-SPP
Master
Master Terminal
Terminal Unit
Unit

Hardware or
software
support for
FD-SPP

FIGURE 4.1.1 Placement of the FD-SPP in a simple SCADA system

Traditional industrial control systems or SCADA systems, do not provide
any authentication or authorization[5], the FD-SPP will add these features to
existing control systems. As described in the previous chapter these techniques
will be implemented using the dual Bloom filter access control, which challenge
response, and the extended Modbus protocol.
4.2. The Microkernel Architecture for the FD-SPP

The microkernel architecture described by Hieb and Graham [1], [4]
isolates software components into isolated address spaces, separating

49

networking device drivers, security enforcing software components, and field
equipment interfaces and drivers. The microkernel enforces these isolations as
well as provides limited communication channels between particular modules.
The module containing the networking device drivers and the module containing
the field device drivers or resources should be completely isolated from each
other. These two modules should only communicate to the security modules
creating a barrier between the input and output of the security device[1]. This
barrier prevents attackers from leveraging an error in the communication driver
to affect the field device [4]. The operating system possesses a critical role in
security enforcement; a microkernel is used by the architecture to minimize the
amount of code in the trusted computing base. The microkernel provides only
the minimum necessary operations including memory abstraction (an address
space), an execution abstraction (threads), and inter process communication
(IPC) [1]. The microkernel must provide strong assurance that interaction
between two address spaces is not possible, and that IPC is limited to specified
threads only. [1]
The FD-SPP uses this microkernel based architecture to insure security
and reliability, in order to achieve this architecture the OKL4 microkernel was
selected. OKL4 is a member of the L4 family of operating systems. The L4
operating systems are second generation microkernel operating systems. OKL4
like all L4 kernels only provides the most basic essentials required for an
operating system[21] and leaves the remainder of the design up to the
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developers. Another L4 operating system seL4 has been formally verified[22].
This means that there is a machine checked mathematical proof that the
implementation in code of seL4 matches the code specifications. It also means
that seL4 code is proven to be free from common programming errors such as
buffer overflows and null pointer accesses[22]. Although this doesn’t imply
security, it is a starting point for building secure software. Additionally this allows
the software above the kernel to be verified since the kernel is verified. OKL4 is
in the same family of operating systems as seL4, the verified distribution of L4, it
should be therefore a small step to make a port from the OKL4 to the verified
kernel.
OKL4 allows the division of software above the kernel layer into cells.
These cells each have their own virtual memory and are segregated from the
other cells [21]. A buffer overflow in cell A cannot affect cell B. Communication
between the cells is provided via IPC in the kernel layer. Additionally, like all
microkernels, device driver level code is in the user application layer. This means
that cells can have access to the hardware. However to prevent this from being a
security issue only one cell can have write access to any given register. Cells can
however share read access to a register [20]. All memory operations including
access to hardware registers are performed using a virtual memory system
provided by the OKL4 microkernel, the system calls required to access this virtual
memory system were developed by Brad Luyster [20].
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4.3. The OKL4 Cell Structure used for the FD-SPP

The FD-SPP software components are broken up into three cells: master
Modbus communication cell, packet filtering security cell, and the slave Modbus
communication cell. Each cell has its own responsibilities, and its own memory
space. This design allows communication handling code and security code to be
run in completely separate memory spaces, and creates a separation between
the code communicating with the master and slave devices. Shown below is the
model of the OKL4 cells for the FD-SPP.

OKL4
Master Modbus
Communication
Cell

Packet Filtering
Security Cell

Slave Modbus
Communication
Cell

FIGURE 4.3.1 OKL4 cells for the FD-SPP
The master Modbus communication cell is responsible for receiving and
sending data to the Modbus master which in this case is the virtual Modbus serial
device. This cell has a driver for one of the UARTs on the device, which allows it
to communicate over RS-232 with the master. The master then scans the data
received by the UART until it finds a valid Modbus packet. This packet is then
sent to the packet filtering security cell via IPC. Since the master Modbus
communication cell only sends valid packets to the packet filtering security cell,
the packet filtering security cell is protected from attacks using invalid packets.
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The packet filtering security cell can also send packets to the master Modbus
communication cell which is responsible for forwarding these packets to the
master.
The slave Modbus communication cell has very similar operations with the
master Modbus communication cell. Additionally the code for the two cells is
almost identical. The slave Modbus communication cell sends and receives data
via RS-232 with the slave (RTU). When it receives data it automatically forwards
the data to the security cell which then passes it through to the master.
Therefore there is no filtering of data for packets being transferred from the
slave to the master. Additionally the slave Modbus communication cell will get
packets from the packet filtering security cell which it will be responsible for
transmitting to the RTU.
The packet filtering security cell has several functions. Its most simple
function is forwarding packets from the slave to the master. When the cell
receives and IPC call from the slave it simply forwards this IPC call to the master.
The primary task of the security cell is extracting the added security pieces out of
the extended Modbus packets, and only sending packets that are verified to the
Slave. This involves several tasks: creating and managing user connections,
creating and validating challenge response packets, and performing role based
access control for each packet and each user as defined in the previous chapter.
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The OKL4 software was divided into three cells, which all have their own
memory space which they can read/write and none of the other cells can access.
In order for these cells to send data to each other they use IPC calls, provided by
the microkernel. All IPC communication channels must be defined at compile
time and cannot be changed during run time. This means that if there are no IPC
communications channels defined between to cells they cannot directly
communicate [20]. Shown below is the layout of the three cells as was shown
previously, however now the threads and IPC calls of the system have been
added.

OKL4
Read Master Serial

Modbus Security
Filter

Write Slave Serial

Write Master Serial

Pass-through Filter

Read Slave Serial

FIGURE 4.3.2 Cell Communication Flow
The most important concept is that the master communication cell and
slave communication cell do not have any communication between them. This
means that in order for a packet to be sent to the RTU it must be passed
through two layers of IPC and two layers of validation checks. Do to the nature
of OKL4 a bug in one of these layers cannot exploit the next layer this makes it
very difficult for an attack packet to propagate through the OKL4 security device.
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4.4. Software Design of OKL4 Cells

The slave Modbus communication cell and the master Modbus
communication cell share much of the same source code and are almost
identical. They both perform the operation of reading and writing to an RS-232
communication port. The STUART (Standard UART) is used for the master
communications, and the BTUART (Bluetooth UART) is used for the slave
communications. The BTUART although it is capable of being used as a
Bluetooth device port is being used in the same way the STUART is as a
standard RS-232 communications port [23]. Both the master and slave
communication cells are broken up into two threads; One thread for polling the
UART and forming Modbus packets to send to the filtering cell and a second for
writing packets to the UART as they are received from the filtering cell. Shown
below is the flow diagram for the read data from UART thread.
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Wait for Clock Ready IPC

Setup UART

Get Packet From UART

Send Packet to Filter

FIGURE 4.4.1 UART read flow chart
The first block on the diagram is a wait for the clocks to be set up for the
UART. This is because only one cell is allowed write access to enable the clocks
for the UART. The master communications cell sets up the UART clocks for itself
and the slave communication cell. Once the thread is notified that the clocks are
set up, it sets up its initialization parameters for the UART such as baud rate and
flow control. After this it begins the process of gathering data from the UART and
sending it to the filter cell. Each communication cell begins filling a buffer with
data and waiting for the 3.5 character times between bytes, which represents
the end of packet in the Modbus standard [24]. Once this 3.5 character times
occurs the communication cell performs a Modbus CRC check on the packet. If
the CRC check matches the packet CRC then this packet is valid and therefore
sent to the filter, otherwise the beginning and ending point of the packet are
marked in the buffer and the communication cell waits for the next packet. The
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communication cell additionally uses a circular buffer, in other words if the end
of the buffer has been reached the bytes are added to the beginning of the
buffer. The diagram below shows what the buffer looks like after the first packet
is read in.

FIGURE 4.4.2 Communication Cell Circular Buffer
When the second packet is read in its data is placed after the first packet.
The same CRC check is performed on this next packet to see if it is a valid
Modbus packet. If so the packet is sent to the filtering cell. Whenever a valid
packet is found and passed to the filtering cell, the buffer is cleared. This
prevents unnecessary CRC checks with invalid data. The diagram below shows
where the second packet is placed in the buffer.

FIGURE 4.4.3 Master Cell second Modbus placement in circular buffer
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If the data in the second packet is invalid, the two packets are looked at
as a single packet. If this reconstructed packet is valid then it is passed on to the
filtering cell. The diagram below shows the reconstructed packet.

FIGURE 4.4.4 Modbus message reconstruction
If this packet is not valid then the process continues for the third packet.
First the packet is checked by itself. If this fails it is checked in combination with
the second packet. If this fails all three packets are combined and checked. This
process is continued with a fourth, fifth or sixth packet. If a seventh packet is
received the first packet is dropped so the system will never remember more
than six packets. This packet reconstruction is necessary to guarantee valid
Modbus packets are sent to the filtering cell from the communication cell.
Due to overhead created by the operating system there was no way to
guarantee that the 3.5 character was enough to signify the end of a packet as in
the Modbus. The 3.5 character times were used to segment groups of bytes
received by the RS-232 port. These groups were then checked to see if they
contained a complete Modbus packet with valid checksum. Using a wired
connection a small number of packets were split in two and needed this
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reconstruction. When the communication was switched to wireless serial the
packets were often split into 2 and sometimes more pieces, it was during the
testing over the wireless lines it became apparent a mechanism was needed to
reconstruct these packets to recreate the robustness that is required by SCADA
systems.
The write data to UART thread is the same for both the Master and Slave
with the only exception being they are writing to different UARTs. The Diagram
below shows the flow of the write data to UART thread.

Wait for IPC

Read IPC to Buffer

Write buffer to UART

FIGURE 4.4.5 Flow in the UART write thread
The operations of this thread are fairly simple. Wait for a message from
the filter then write that data to the UART.
Like the communication cells, which have two threads each the filtering
cell also has two threads one for managing traffic from the slave to the master
and one for managing traffic from the master to the slave. The first thread that
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manages traffic from the slave to the master is very simple. All it does is wait for
packets from the slave cell then forward them to the Master cell. This thread is
mostly needed to create isolation between the Master and Slave communication
cells.
The thread that filters data from the master cell to the slave cell is much
more complex. This cell is responsible for setting up communications with a user,
performing role based access control, and validating packets via challenge
response. This section will provide an overview of these operations but more
details can be found in chapter 3.
Like all the threads in this system the general idea for this thread is wait
for packet, perform operation, wait for next packet. So first the system waits for
a packet from the Master cell. After receiving the packet, the packet is checked
to see if a challenge or connection request is required before allowing this packet
to pass through. If a connection request is required the filtering cell sends a
connection request back to the master cell which forwards the packet to the
master (HMI). Likewise, if a challenge is required, a challenge is sent to the
master cell which forwards the packet to the Master (MHI). Otherwise the packet
is rejected entirely or allowed through to the slave cell which forwards the packet
to the slave device. The diagram below shows the summary view of the flow of
the filtering cell.
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[Response Packet Function Code Incorrect]

[Challenge Required]

[CRC is Valid]
ReceivePacket

Check CRC

Challenge Response

Check Requires Challenge

[Allow Packet Passthrough] [Packet Authenticated]
[Connection Not Established]
Send Packet to Slave

Wait For Packet

Reject Packet

Send Connection Request
[Packet Not Authenticated]

FIGURE 4.4.6 Flow of a packet through the filtering cell
The check requires challenge function plays a vital role in determining
what happens to each packet. Show in figure 4.4.7 is a diagram that shows how
the outcome of for each packet is formed.

[User Id Invalid]

[yes]
Save RTU Address

Check Connection Request

Save User Id

Return Connection Required

Return Challenge Required

Check Connection Status
[yes]

[connected]

Return Bloom Filter Result
Check if Administator

Check Bloom Filter Entries

FIGURE 4.4.7 Modbus packet determination flow
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The diagrams both show a very high level view of the operations of the
filtering cell, to see more details see the challenge response and role based
access control section below that specifies the detailed implementation of each
of these functions.
4.5. Implementation of the Dual Bloom Filters for RBAC

As described in chapter 3, dual Bloom filters were created for the role
based access control for the field device security preprocessor, in order to create
the optimal Bloom filter, it must be known previously how much data, or in this
case how many packets are going to be stored in the Bloom filter. In order to do
this for an existing system the packets can simply be watched. A listener with a
similar architecture to the FD-SPP can instead of filtering packets output them to
a program that simple records them. It must also be known which user must be
allowed to perform each operation. In order to find all the packets and create the
Bloom filter in a simple easy to use way the following program was created. The
recording system works as follows, first a system user is created, as well as a
role for that system user. Then the user begins using the existing SCADA system
as they would normally, the program listens to the packets used by the user and
saves them. It can also be specified whether the operations or some of the
operations require a challenge. After all the operations for one role, the next user
can perform all of their operations, and the system can record those. After all the
operations that the system should perform are recorded along with the users
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that can perform all those operations the dual Bloom filters containing those
operations can be created. Shown below is a screenshot of the recording
software capable of creating the dual Bloom filters for an existing SCADA system.

FIGURE 4.5.1 Bloom Filter Creation Software Screenshot
The Bloom filters created from this software can simply be placed into the
field device security preprocessor, which will then use them for RBAC control. In
this system all the packets must be known before the system is implemented,
creating the Bloom filters before implementation and creating no method for
updating them prevents an attacker from changing the role based access control
policies. Future versions of the FD-SPP may allow for updating but this will not
be done through a network update. The Bloom filters could be kept in removable
flash memory, which can be physically swapped out in order to update the RBAC
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policy. In the current implementation however, the Bloom filters are hard coded
and updated at compile time.
4.6. An Example Access Check in the Dual Bloom Filters

The Bloom filters created by capturing software are checked by the FDSPP in order to implement its RBAC. Like described in the previous chapter this is
done by appending the role of the currently logged in user with each Modbus
packet received by the FD-SPP and passing it through a variety of hash
functions. However the FD-SPP only passes the <role, operation> pair into a
single hash function SHA-256. This 256-bit hash can be broken up into a large
number of small hash functions. For example suppose Bloom filters of length
1024 bits are used, for this hash functions that produce 10 bits ( log2(1024) ) are
required. The single SHA-256 hash can be used to create twenty-five 10-bit hash
functions. Since SHA-256 is approved by NIST[25], which list random number
generators as recommended use for its approved hash functions[26], the bits in
the SHA-256 hash must uncorrelated be completely independent of each
other[27]. This means that the sub-hash functions (10-bit chunks of the original
SHA-256 bit hash) can be seen as independent hash functions that are all
suitable for use for implementation of a Bloom filter. This technique of splitting a
large hash function into smaller hash functions was also used by Tripunitara and
Carbunar [16]. In order to ensure correctness are reduce coding time an open
source c implementation of SHA-256 created by Aaron Gifford[28] and modified
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by Brad Luyster[20] for compatibility with OKL4 was used to generate the SHA256 hashes required by the FD-SPP.
Assuming that k is selected to be seven, each hash function can be
created from 10 bits any two bytes of the SHA-256. Figure 4.6.1 shows how 7
hash functions are created using the first 14 bytes of the SHA-256 Algorithm.

Modbus
Packet

Role Id

SHA-256
256 bit Hash

Use the hash in groups
of two bytes in place of
k hash functions

Set the bits at each of
the k positions to 1

M bit bloom filter

FIGURE 4.6.1 Using SHA-256 to Add Entries to a Bloom filter

4.7. Reduction of the False Positive Rate

In order to reduce the false positive rate it is important to understand
what variables are related to the false positive rate of the Bloom filter. Simply
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put, if two Bloom filters have the same number of hash functions k, and the
same number of bits m, then the only thing that can make the false positive rate
any different is the number of ones. But how could one reduce the number of
ones for a given Bloom filter without reducing the amount of data stored in the
filter. Theoretically the number of entries into the Bloom filter is based on the
number of entries times the number of hash functions minus the number of
collisions. If the number of collisions is increased the Bloom filter will have a
lower false positive rate [10]. It is important to note that this does not mean
getting hash functions which generally create more collisions it means getting
hash functions that collide for the specific values that are added to the Bloom
filter. The hash functions must still have uniform results for any arbitrary input
data otherwise the bias will allow for more false positives not less [10].
For example, assume two entries A and B are going to be placed in to a
Bloom filter that uses 7 hash functions. When they are added they each add 7
bits to the Bloom filter for a total of 14 bits set. What if we had a list of hash
functions where we could select the 7 hash functions that had the most
collisions? First assume we can use the same number of hash functions but now
there is one collision. This collision results in 13 bits added to the bloom filter
instead of 14. Since this value is being taken to the k power, even adding a small
number of collisions can have a large effect on the false positive rate.
(4.7.1)
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In this case the adding of a single collision reduced the false positive rate
to 60% of its former value. Now for a more general case let x be the number of
entries in the filter and c be the collision percentage that can be invoked,
therefore ( ) can be reduced to (
false positive rate by

) . This means that we can reduce the

. For example creating a collision rate of 10%

for the known entries of the Bloom filter reduces the false positive rate by over
50% when 7 hash functions are used.
In the example above the challenge response Bloom filter had 7 hash
functions, 1024 bit length and 14 bits set to one. This produces a false positive
rate for non-challenged entries of
(4.7.2)

Using 74 hash functions to search for collision among the 2 entries, 7 new
hash functions all with uniform output distributions were able to be selected that
had 3 collisions for the 2 entries into the challenge response bloom filter. This
reduces the number of ones from 14 to 11. This creates a collision rate of
, which allows for a reduction in the false positive rate of

(

)
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(4.7.3)

This allows for over an 80% reduction in the false positive rate using the
same number of hash functions, entries, and bit length. The new false positive
rate for non-challenged false positives is
(4.7.4)

Additionally all the hash functions used for this were based on the same
SHA-256 hash as the previous design was therefore there is no additional cost
for using these hash partitions as opposed to the original partitions. For example
pairs of two bytes were taken to create each of the 7 hash functions, however
only 10 of the 16 bits were needed. Hash functions could be created from any 10
of these 16 bits, thus creating a number of hash functions that can be easily
used with nominal cost. 8008 different 10-bit hash functions, with 10 unique bits
can be selected from the 2 bytes used above to create the sub-hash functions in
the example above. Since all of the bits of the SHA-256 hash function should be
uncorrelated and unbiased any 10 bits can be selected to make a 10 bit hash
function that is suitable for Bloom filters. The hash functions created from the
SHA-256 hash should not share any bits, to ensure they are not correlated in the
general since. If the absolute minimum false positive rate is desired, it is possible
to check the false positive rate of all the Bloom filters that could be created from
all the allowable combinations of hash functions. Since the design of the FD-SPP
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requires that the entire set of <role, operation> pairs to known in advance it is
not unfeasible for this to be done, however this would take a very long time and
is probably not worth the effort. Figure 4.7.1 shows the probability of each
possible number of bits being set to “1”, in a 1024 bit Bloom Filter using 7 hash
functions after 18 entries have been added created by simulating bits being set
in Bloom Filter 10000000 times.
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FIGURE 4.7.1 Probability Distribution of number of ones in the Bloom Filter
The average number of bits set to “1” for this Bloom filter is 118.6. In 10000000
runs of the simulation the lowest number of bits set to 1 in any Bloom filter was
103 out of the 1024, this happened 2 times. It is possible for a Bloom filter of
this size to have much less bits set to “1”, but the odds of this happening are
very low since the odds of getting smaller number of bits shrinks exponentially.
There is only around a 1% chance of getting a value of 112 or less. 112 bits set
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to “1” corresponds to a false positive rate of 1.87252E-07, which is the around
two thirds of the average false positive rate for this Bloom filter of 2.7975E-07.
For this size filter if 100 combinations of hash functions are created and tested
there is a good chance one set will be found that will have a false positive rate of
around two thirds of the estimated false positive rate. Searching 10000000
combinations of hash functions is likely to produce a Bloom filter that has a false
positive rate of one third of the estimated false positive rate. As can be seen a
short search can reduce the false positive rate of the Bloom filter, and searching
for a long time can produce an even larger reduction. It is up to the implementer
to decide how much time they are willing to use searching for hash functions
that produce Bloom filters with large number of internal collisions, and thus low
false positive rates.
4.8. Prototype of the Field Device Security Preprocessor

For the purpose of lab testing, a prototype FD-SPP was constructed using the
previously described design. The prototype was built using the Gumstix® verdex
pro™ XM4 COM single board computer. The OKL4 software system is designed to
run on the Marvell® PXA270 with XScale® processor which was the primary
motivation for choosing the Gumstix® verdex pro™ XM4 COM. The XM4 has 64
MB of RAM and 16 MB of Flash. Currently the FD-SPP doesn’t use the Flash
memory and all code is operated in RAM, however this may change in later
revisions. The entire system uses less than 1 MB of RAM. The system also
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requires 2 or more serial communication ports, one to connect to the master
device and one to talk to the slave. These can be added by connecting the
Gumstix console-vx expansion board. Shown in figure 4.8.1 below is the Gumstix
and the attached console-vx board that were used to create the prototype for
the FD-SPP.

FIGURE 4.8.1 Field Device Security Preprocessor Prototype
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5.

TESTING OF THE FIELD DEVICE SECURITY PRE-PROCESSOR

This section describes testing and refinement of the prototype FD-SPP.

An

HMI/MTU test harness and a simulation environment were constructed for
testing purposes. An actual legacy field device, a Sixnet mIPM RTU, was part of
the test framework. The mIPM supports serial communication and the Modbus
protocol. The mIPM has 24 IO points, and a simple HMI/MTU was built that
could, via Modbus, read and write these “coils”.
5.1. Java Modbus HMI Design

For this project the Modbus HMI and MTU were integrated into a single Java
program developed using Netbeans IDE. The software uses the RXTX[29]
package to communicate via RS232 to the FD-SPP. The program provided typical
Modbus features such as reading and writing coils, as well as, support for
security. The HMI provides four toggle buttons, which when pressed send
Modbus write coils packets to the FD-SPP. The HMI also provides a “read” button
which sends a Modbus read coils packet to the FD-SPP. Additionally the HMI
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provides the extended Modbus features required by the FD-SPP. The login
request packet is sent by pressing the “login button”; this sends a login request
packet containing the provided user id. The HMI also automatically replies to
challenge responses using the password that is in the password field.
The HMI also monitors responses from the FD-SPP. As with most Master-Slave
protocols when the master sends a message there will always be a response. If
the HMI does not receive a response to any packet it sends, it will indicate this
by turning the box next to the words “no reply” red, and force the user to issue a
new login request. When a valid packet is received the box next to connected
will turn green to indicate the communication channel between the HMI and FDSPP is working properly. If this packet is a response to a read coils command the
digital input indicators will show which digital inputs are on (red) and which are
off (gray).
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FIGURE 5.1.1 Java Modbus HMI

5.2. Initial performance data

Adding the FD-SPP increases the amount of time it takes for a packet to be sent
from the master to the slave and from the slave to the master. A command line
based communications timing program was created in C# to test the timing
performance of the test SCADA network with and without the field device
security preprocessor. The timing data below in table 5.2.1, collected by the
program, shows the increase in time compared to the time without the security
device in place. Two cases were tested for each, “with security” and “without
security” implementations. The first case was reading coils. The second was
writing coils, which included a challenge response for the “with security”
implementation. For the purpose of this test, and the rest of the tests below,
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write coils commands are always challenged when the FD-SPP is in place, and
read coils commands are not challenged.
Shown below in figure 5.2.1 is the diagram of how challenged Modbus packets
would propagate through the system. The Timer software replaces the HMI. It
sends a Modbus packet to either the RTU(to test without security), or the FDSPP(to test with security) times how long it takes to receive the Modbus
response for the sent message, therefore how long it takes the packet to
propagate through the system, including the challenge response cycle if
required.

Existing ModbusRTU Control
System

OKL4 Modbus Security
Device

Virtual Serial Device

Modbus Command
Modbus Command
Challenge
Challenge Response
Modbus Command
Modbus Response
Modbus Response
Modbus Response

FIGURE 5.2.1 Modbus packet propagation
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RTU

TABLE 5.2.1 Initial Timing Data
Read Coils
Without Security

Write Coils

With Security Without Security

With Security

Trails

500

500

500

500

Minimum

116ms

144ms

127ms

257ms

Median

119ms

163ms

129ms

281ms

Average

119ms

165ms

129ms

278ms

Maximum

140ms

207ms

140ms

304ms

This timing data was taken using 9600 baud serial connections. A Similar FD-SPP
implementation using alternative communication protocol was also tested at a
later time. Data from this alternative communication showed that packets with
challenges could propagate through the system in less than 90ms.
5.3. Modbus compliance testing

This set of test was written using the Unit Testing Suite built into Visual Studio.
The Test Suite works in place of the HMI, just like the timer program. Shown in
figure 5.3.1 is the system diagram for these tests.
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Visual Studio
Testing Suite

RS-232

FD-SPP

RS-232

RTU

FIGURE 5.3.1 Compliance testing system diagram

These tests do not test security but test that the system operates as specified to
when any given packet is encountered. Shown below is the test result output
which was displayed by Visual Studio. The following subsections discuss each
individual test in more detail.

FIGURE 5.3.2 Compliance Checker Output

5.3.1. Test Login Success

This test checks to make sure that the user login procedure works properly for a
valid login. First the test sends a login request packet to the OKL4 Modbus
security device. The test then collects data from the receive port for a small
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amount of time. This data is then checked to make sure it is a challenge packet.
The test then sends the proper challenge response to complete the login. Once
again the test waits to see if the security device response. Since currently there
is no “login complete packet” the security device should not respond to the
challenge response. A “login complete packet” may be created for a future
revision of this system. After the system has verified that device did not send any
data, it sends a read coils packet to confirm the connection. If the response to
this packet is not the “Connection Required/Requested Packet” the connection is
deemed successful.
5.3.2. Test Login Invalid User

This test checks to make sure that the user login procedure works properly when
an invalid user id is sent in the connection request. First this test sends a
connection request with an invalid user id to the OKL4 Modbus security device.
Since the user id is invalid the OKL4 Modbus security device responds with a
“Connection Required/Requested” Packet. The test checks to see if the packet it
received is a “Connection Required/Requested” Packet, if so the OKL4 Modbus
Security Device passes this test.
5.3.3. Test Login Invalid Password

This test checks to make sure that the user login procedure works properly for a
login with a valid user but incorrect password. First, the test sends a login
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request packet to the OKL4 Modbus security device. The test then collects data
from the receive port for a small amount of time. This data is then checked to
make sure it is a challenge packet. The test then sends the challenge response
formed with the incorrect password to complete the login process. Once again
the test waits to see if the security device responds. Since currently there is no
“login complete packet” the security device should not respond to the challenge
response. A “login complete packet” may be created for a future revision of this
system. After the system has verified that the device did not send any data, it
sends a Read Coils packet to confirm the connection. If the response to this
packet is not the “Connection Required Packet” the connection is deemed
successful. In this case receiving the “Connection Required Packet” is a
successful run of the test since this would imply that the login was unsuccessful.
5.3.4. Test Packet RBAC Challenge

This test is broken up into four separate tests. Each of the tests preforms a login
with a particular user and then sends a packet. This test is verifying the proper
response is returned by the RBAC. The three responses tested are: no-challenge,
challenge, and reject. For this Test it is assumed the following permissions have
been set up in the bloom filters. User 1 can read and write coils but challenges
are required on writes. User 2 can read coils only, no challenges are required.
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The first test performs a login as user 1, and sends a read coils packet. The
test then verifies that there is a response to this packet, and that the
response is a valid read coils response and not a challenge request.



The second test performs a login as user 1, and sends a write coil packet.
The test then verifies that the response to this packet is a challenge request.



The third test performs a login as user 2, and sends a read coil packet. The
test then verifies that the there is a response to this packet, and that the
response is a valid read coils response and not a challenge request packet.



The fourth test performs a login as user 2, and sends a write coil packet. The
test then verifies that there is no response to this packet, therefore it was
rejected.

5.3.5. Test Challenge-Response

This test is responsible for testing the full challenge response exchange as shown
in figure 5.2.1. This test first performs a login as user 1 then the sends write
packets to the RTU which causes a challenge to be made. The proper response is
then sent to these challenges. The test then waits for the response of this
challenge. If this response confirms that the coils have been written then the
challenge response protocol is working properly. This test also tests improper
challenge responses to confirm that the proper response is required for a packet
to propagate to the slave RTU.
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5.3.6. Test Packet Reconstruction

This test is responsible for testing the packet reconstruction abilities of the OKL4
Modbus security device. This test sends packets that have been split by a small
amount of time, to confirm that the OKL4 Modbus security device is properly
combining them into a single valid packet. This reconstruction is necessary
because the separation of bytes into packets is done in software by the OKL4
Modbus security device and can often not be precise enough to separate packets
based on the 3.5 character stop time specified in the Modbus protocol standard.
This test uses unchallenged read commands split in to pieces and verifies that a
read response was sent in return. The test also sends garbage packets in an
attempt to trick the OKL4 device. The test makes sure that only consecutives
packets pieces that combine to a single valid packet are accepted by the device.
5.3.7. Test RBAC Suspicious Mode

This test is responsible for making sure the system properly enters and leaves
suspicious mode. This is performed by creating a user that can only read coils.
The test logs in as this user, and attempts to write to a coil. Since this operation
is not allowed by the RBAC this should cause the system to enter suspicious
mode which cause all packets to be challenged. The test then attempts to read a
coil. The response of this should be a challenge if not the test fails. If the
response is a challenge the proper response is sent sending the system back into
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normal mode. A second read packet can then be sent to verify this transition. If
the packet is not challenged, the devices has properly reentered normal
operating mode. Various amounts of read packets are sent after a write packet
to confirm proper operations of the suspicious mode, and the switching between
modes.
5.3.8. Test Write Coils

Unlike all of the tests above, this test requires a tester to supply input to the test.
This test logins as a user and begin writing coils. After each write the test pops
up a dialog asking what the current state of the RTU digital outputs are. The test
then checks to see if which of the DO on the Sixnet RTU are active, and inputs
this to the dialog. If the input to this dialog matches the write coils packet that
was sent to the RTU then the write was a success. Shown below in figure 5.3.3
is the dialog presented to the tester.

FIGURE 5.3.3 Digital output dialog displayed to Tester
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5.3.9. Test Read Coils

This test is responsible for making sure reading coils is working properly. This
test is very similar to the write coils test; it asks a tester what the current states
of the digital inputs are the Sixnet RTU are and then performs a read. If these
two values match then the coils were read properly. It then allows the user to
change the coils and read again to further confirm the read is working correctly.
Shown below is the dialog for the read coils test.

FIGURE 5.3.4 Read coils dialog box

5.4. Penetration Testing

For the purpose of penetration testing two lab setups were conceived. The first
of which did not have the FD-SPP, and the second did. Shown below are the two
lab configurations.
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Attack PC

Wireless Serial
Transmitter/
Receiver

Windows 7 PC

Wireless Serial
Transmitter/
Receiver

HMI

Wireless Serial
Transmitter/
Receiver

FD-SPP

RTU

FIGURE 5.4.1 Penetration testing setup with FD-SPP

Attack PC

Wireless Serial
Transmitter/
Receiver

Windows 7 PC

HMI

Wireless Serial
Transmitter/
Receiver

Wireless Serial
Transmitter/
Receiver

RTU

FIGURE 5.4.2 Penetration testing setup control setup

The attack PC was used to monitor, and inject Modbus packets onto the wireless
serial connection. A number of different attacks were carried out. The different
attacks and the results are described in the following sections.
summarizes the results of the penetration testing.
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Table 5.4.1

TABLE 5.4.1 Penetration testing results.
Attack

Without

With

With Security and

Security

Security

Signatures

Write Coils

Success

Failed

Failed

Write Random Coils

Success

Failed

Failed

Read Coils

Success

Success

Success

HMI Read Attack

Success

Success

Failed

HMI Write Attack

Success

Success

Failed

DOS Attack

Success

Success

Success

5.4.1. Write Coils Attack

Since there is no built in security anyone on the network can send a packet. For
this test a simple write multiple coils command were transmitter onto the
network. The packet sent on the network (in hex) was 010F000000040105fe95.
For this attack the FD-SPP protected the RTU from the attack, while without the
security the attacker was very easily able to write to the coils.
5.4.2. Write Random Coils Repeatedly Attack

This attack takes the previous attack one step farther. It sends randomly
generated write coils attacks very rapidly in an attempt to get the security
software confused, or in an incorrect state. For this attack the security piece
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protected the RTU from the attack, while without the security the attacker was
very easily able to write to the coils. The security piece did not allow any of the
unauthenticated packets to go through and after the attack was able to return to
normal operating mode and allow authenticated write coil packets to pass
through.
5.4.3. Theoretical Write Coils Attacks

Since with all security it is not whether or not an attack is possible that matters,
but a measure of how difficult the attack is to perform, this section will cover the
theoretical attacks that could be used. This section covers writing coils but can
apply to any packet that is a challenged packet and in the Bloom filter as such
for a particular user. There are two mechanisms that control security, and in
order to defeat the security the attack must exploit at least one of these
mechanisms.
The first of which is the challenge response. When a packet, such as a Write

Coils packet is challenged, the attack could attempt to create the proper
response packet. Since each challenge contains 4 bytes of nonce the user cannot
simply apply a replay attack. If the user simply records traffic they can begin to
accumulate challenge responses. Eventually since there are a finite number of
nonce values the attacker will eventually be able to perform a replay attack using
the saved nonce values. A size of four bytes means that the nonce can take the
form of 4294967296 different bit sequences. However the attacker would not
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need to see every bit sequence to get a single packet through, using similar
equations to the Bloom filter ones in chapter two the average amount of packets
an attacker would have to see before getting a successful replay can be
calculated by solving equation 5.4.1, where m is the total number of
combinations, and n is the average number of bit sequences it takes to see a
single repeated sequence.

(

(

) )

(5.4.1)

Solving for n numerically using Maple with m = 4294967296, gives n =
92682.73335. Assuming the attacker gets the best case scenario, seeing the
same command sent continuously, they will see on average one packet they
need approximately every 275ms it would take over 7.5 hours for the attacker to
get a single packet they can replay. However the attacker would probably want a
much higher number of packets to perform an actual attack. For example for the
attacker to have a 10% chance of sending a packet and receiving a challenge
packet they must have seen 10% of the total number of packets that are
different. Solving equation 5.4.2 for n gives the number of packets that must be
seen for the attacker to have a 10% chance of getting an attack to succeed.

(

(

) )
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(5.4.2)

Solving for n numerically with m = 4294967296, gives n = 452519969. Again
assuming the attacker gets the best case scenario as describe previously it would
take almost 4 years to get enough packets. Additionally, it is unlikely the same
user will be sending the same packet over and over on any SCADA system the
attacker would want to attack. This being showing it is highly unlikely an attacker
would ever succeed in a replay attack on the FD-SPP.
The second part of the challenge response the user could attempt to guess is the
password. The password is stored in 8 bytes, which means there are 2(8*8)
combinations of passwords. In order to check passwords the attacker would
have to write coils and use the password on the challenge then check the coils.
Without being able to see the coils this would be difficult. The other strategy
would be to try to login as a user using the password. Since there is no
successful login response the attack would then have to perform another
operation to verify that the login was successful. Combined either of these
strategies would take at least 300ms. In order to check all the passwords that
could be used it would take 1.75*1011 years. Even if only half this time was
needed (the time on average to find the correct password) the attacker would
still be searching for a time much greater than their lifetime. Additionally this
type of attack would also act as DOS on the network and be quickly detected by
any user attempting to use the system.

88

The second system an attacker could attack is the RBAC Bloom filters. This
attack is even more unlikely to be successful than the previous attack. This
attack involves creating a packet that will successfully make it through the nonchallenged Bloom filter. This means the packet would be directly sent to the
RTU. However most regular Modbus packets are unlikely to be in the nonchallenged Bloom filter and it is most likely that they are checked to make sure
they are not in this Bloom filter. This means that a special attack packet must be
crafted to write the coils, or be performed when a user that cannot write coils is
logged in.
For the attack to work using a user that cannot write coils a false positive must
occur whenever that user writes coils, since there are only a small number of
packets which this can occur they can all be checked to make sure none exist.
This special packet would contain a Modbus write coils packet as the first part of
the packet, and then data would be appended to the packet to make it in the
Bloom filter. The proper CRC would also have to be added to the packet a valid
Modbus packet. If the packet was able to pass through the Bloom filter and be
sent to the RTU it would require that the RTU be checking the packets for a CRC
match byte by byte, or an error occur splitting the write coils packet from the
rest of the packet to create a successful write.
This attack is more of a series of unfortunate events more than it is a planned
Modbus attack. Also since after one failure the RBAC Bloom filters enter
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suspicious mode, the attacker would only have one attempt before they would
have to wait for regular traffic to reset the RBAC back to normal mode. This
attack, like the one above, would also be detected way before the attacker could
succeed. Since the attack needs a bit error to occur, when the attacker finally
finds a packet that is a false positive the attack may still not be successful
because there is a very low probability of getting the exact bit error the attacker
needs. Without offline access to the Bloom filter, the attack will likely never know
if they have found a false positive. Therefore the attack success rate will be
much less than the bloom filter non-challenged false positive rate. Attack packets
like the ones discussed here were sent at the RTU directly without the security to
test the likelihood of a this type of bit error occurring; however in the 1000
packets sent 0 were successful in writing the coils. Therefore it is extremely
unlikely an attack of this kind could succeed.
5.4.4. Read Coils Attack

In the system that was used for testing reading coils was considered non critical.
The challenge response was not required to read coils. Therefore once a user
logs in the coils can be read in the same way they would be in a non-secured
system. In order to attack this system a read coils command was transmitted by
the attack, the attacker could then read the resulting packet. If the attacker
wanted to be less obvious about their attacks the attacker could just wait until a
read coils command is issued by the user then read the results. Since the data is
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not encrypted, an attacker would be able to perform this second attack even if
challenge response was applied on issuing the command. Both with and without
the FD-SPP this attack was successful.
5.4.5. Attacks on the HMI

In current configuration packets going from the HMI to the FD-SPP can be
challenged; however packets going from the FD-SPP to the HMI are not
protected. Two attacks on the HMI were performed by injecting traffic to the
wireless serial connection to the HMI. Both these attacks work on the system
with and without the security additions.
5.4.6. Read Coils Attack on HMI

In this attack the attacker waits for a read coil command to be sent from the
HMI to the FD-SPP, once the packet is sent the attacker sends a packet to collide
with the read coils response sent by the FD-SPP. Since the packets collide no
valid data is received. The attacker then sends their own read coils response
code. The HMI sees this faked packet as the real read coils response. This allows
the attacker to make the user think different things are happening in the network
then what really are.
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5.4.7. Write Coils Attack on HMI

In this attack the attacker waits for a write coil command to be sent from the
HMI to the FD-SPP, once the packet is sent the attacker sends a packet to collide
with the write coils packet to prevent it from getting to the FD-SPP, if this fails
making a packet collide with the challenge will perform the same thing. The idea
is to stop the write coils packet from ever making it to the RTU by any means
necessary. Once the packet is stopped the attacker can then send a write coils
response to the serial connection of the HMI. In this way the attacker can make
the user think they are writing coils when they are not.
5.5. Digital Signatures for Return Packets

After penetration testing it was clear a second layer of security was needed. An
attacker was able to trick the HMI into thinking they were the RTU. In order to
prevent this attack a digital signature was added to each return packet sent from
the FD-SPP to the HMI.
5.5.1. Creation of the Digitally Signed Messages

The digital signature is created the same way the challenge response hashes are.
They are created by hashing the Modbus packet without the CRC, with 4 bytes of
nonce, with the 8 byte pre-shared secret using the SHA-256 hash algorithm.
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Modbus Packet Without CRC

Nonce

Preshared Secret

SHA-256 Hash

8-Byte Signature

FIGURE 5.5.1 Return Packet Digital Signature

The digital signature is then appended to the Modbus Packet without CRC. A
Modbus CRC for this new combined packet is then appended to the end to create
a valid Modbus Packet. Using a signature instead of a challenge-response
reduced the overhead created by the extra message passing that is required for
a challenge-response. This way the only time that is added to the process is the
time it takes to sign the packet and a small increase in packet propagation
through the network since packet sizes are increased by 8 bytes.

5.5.2. Timing Data for Signed Packets

Shown in Table 5.5.1 is the table for packet propagation times after the addition
of the packet signing routines.
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TABLE 5.5.1 Timing data for return message digital signatures
Read

Write

Coils
50

Coils
50

Trails
Minimum

169ms 288ms

Median

192ms 304ms

Average

189ms 307ms

Maximum

201ms 325ms

Comparing this table to the original time data reveals that adding the Digital
Signature only adds a few milliseconds. Since the difference between reading
and writing coils is a challenge response, it can be seen that the challenge
response adds a lot more time than the digital signature.
5.5.3. Nonce Generation for the Signature

Since the Nonce is typically generated by a random number generator and sent
in the challenge, the removal of this challenge presents a problem with nonce
generation. It is important that the nonce be different on each message sent in
order to prevent replay attacks. Additionally this nonce cannot be sent in the
message because then the attacker could choose what nonce to send therefore
allowing an opportunity for a replay attack.
The nonce therefore must be different each time it is generated and able to be
predicted by both the sender and the receiver of the message. In order to
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achieve this, a pseudo random number generator was created to serve the
nonce. The 32-bit (4 bytes) pseudo random number generator was creating
using two independent 16-bit random number generators. The first was a linear
congruential generator with period of 53124 and the second was a linear
feedback shift register with period 65535 [30]. Together these pseudo random
number generators combine to create a single 32 bit pseudo random number
generator with a period of 1160493780. Additionally the pseudo random number
generator is reseeded by a separate random number generator which adds
entropy from a counter on the FD-SPP during every challenge and a separate
random on the HMI during every challenge response. Since it is highly unlikely
that 1160493780 packets in a row will be unchallenged it is likely that entropy
will be added before the pseudo random generator repeats, and the nonce
values for the digital signature should be random enough to ensure a high
amount of protection from replay attacks.
Each time a nonce value was required to create a digital signature the last used
nonce values are used as seeds to the generator. Since both systems know the
old nonce values and have the same generator they will get the same new nonce
values without have to communicate them. This allows for a shared source of
nonce without having to communicate the nonce, and prevents replay attacks.
In order to inject more randomness into the nonce the nonce values from the
challenge response will also be used. When a challenge response generates new
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random nonce both systems will set this as their old nonce to be used as a seed
the next time they sign a packet. Two of these bytes will come from the 4 nonce
bytes sent in the challenge and another two bytes are included in the response
packet. This way both systems create and control the nonce. This prevents an
attacker from being able to choose all the nonce values, and then perform replay
attacks. With the addition of the digital signatures and the new nonce creation,
the attacker can no longer perform either of the previously discussed HMI
Attacks on the system.
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6.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This thesis has provided the details of the design and development of a
Bloom filter authentication module field device security preprocesser as a
security solution for legacy SCADA field device based on the previous work of
Hieb and Graham [1]. This device provides several missing security features to
legacy SCADA field devices using the Modbus protocol, and could easily be
adapted for other SCADA protocols. The field device uses a micro-kernel
operating system called OKL4, which allows for a high level of security by
abstracting memory and execution spaces. The security features implemented on
the field device include role based access control and challenge response. The
focus of this thesis has been the design, implementation, analysis of these
security features using Bloom filters.
6.1. Results Summary

Although Bloom filters have false positive authentication it was shown
through analysis as well as penetration testing that this structure is acceptable
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for many security applications. Additionally it was shown that by increasing the
space used to store the Bloom filter and by finding hash functions that produce
high internal collision rates for the given data set, the false positive rate can be
reduced to the point where it is more than or as secure as an n-bit symmetric
encryption key.
Through performance testing it was shown that the propagation delay
added by inserting a field device security pre-process around 275ms which is an
acceptable level for use in the Department of Homeland Security Water Sector.
The dual Bloom filter structure allows for role based access checks to be
performed at a very high speed, only costing around 18µs, lowering the
overhead cost of the FD-SPP on the SCADA network.
6.2. Direction for Future Work

The future work for the field device security preprocessor can go a
number of directions. One direction is to add support for more protocols and
interfaces. Modbus is not the only SCADA protocol being used in industry and in
order to protect legacy systems, the protocols that are being used by these
systems must be supported. Also, RS-232 is not the only interface SCADA
systems are using. Modbus even has its own protocol for communicating over
TCP/IP. In order to support these SCADA networks, this interface must be
supported by the FD-SPP. Additionally the FD-SPP could act as an adapter that
changes the interface from RS-232 to Ethernet or vice versa. The cell structure
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of FD-SPP makes adding new protocols and changing interfaces very easy; once
cells are created they can be simply swapped in and out to create new variants
of the FD-SPP. Preliminary testing shows that, as expected, a FD-SPP using
TCP/IP is a lot faster than one using serial communication, and the overhead
created by the FD-SPP is much smaller.
The OKL4 micro-kernel operating system has a close relative known as
seL4, which has been formally verified [22]. Future development will need to
consider porting this software to the verified kernel. Once the software is running
on seL4, the software itself must be verified. Possibly, in a similar manner to
seL4 using machine assisted and machine checked formal proof [22]. Although
verification does not guarantee that the FD-SPP is secure, it would confirm that
the software behaves completely as specified and any exploits would be of the
design, not software bugs. A verified version of the FD-SPP could go a long way
to reduce the vulnerabilities of legacy systems.
An alternative to verifying the FD-SPP software running on seL4 would be
to implement it on a FPGA and verify the VHDL code. Verification should be
much easier since there has been some prior research into the formal verification
of VHDL[31]. The software only has a few simple parts and could be
implemented on an FPGA with little difficulty. The Bloom Filter does not require
complex software other than the SHA-256 hash. Since it is known that SHA-256
can be implemented on a FPGA, it should be a small step to implement the dual
Bloom filter on a FPGA. Additionally, the challenge response routine also uses
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SHA-256 and a small state machine; these two should be possible to implement
on a FPGA. By implementing the FD-SPP in hardware, it can be made faster than
using the general purpose hardware, further reducing the overhead added to the
network.
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